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This paper empirically documents one way in which prosecutorial discretion can
be used to dampen the e®ects of mandatory minimum sentencing laws. Speci¯cally,
I show prosecutors use their discretion over prosecution charges to circumvent a
mandatory minimum sentencing law for some defendants, by prosecuting these de-
fendants who were initially arrested for the crime targeted by the sentencing law
for lesser crimes not covered by the law. I document the use of such discretion with
respect to several state \three-strikes" type repeat o®ender laws imposed through-
out the 1990s, where I ¯nd that prosecutors become signi¯cantly more likely to
lower a defendant's prosecution charge to a misdemeanor when conviction for the
initial felony arrest charge would likely lead to sentencing under a three-strikes law.
Moreover, accounting for such behavior is important, as I show that failure to do
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1so can lead to overstating the e®ects of these laws on average sentencing by almost
thirty percent.
1 Introduction
The use of mandatory minimum sentencing laws has become quite widespread through-
out the United States. By 1994, at least one version of a mandatory minimum sentencing
law was on the books in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Gov-
ernment (Tonry, 1996). The motivation for these laws has primarily been to provide
a simple and politically viable means of increasing the expected sentence for individu-
als who commit certain crimes, through limiting the sentencing discretion available to
actors within the judicial system (U.S.S.C., 1991; Nelson, 1992).
While mandatory minimum sentencing laws appear to signi¯cantly curtail the dis-
cretionary in°uence judges have over the minimum sentence they impose on convicted
criminals,1 the point has been raised that these laws may simply shift the discretion
to other actors in the judicial process, namely prosecutors. As stated by the Bureau
of Justice Assistance (1996), \The concern is that (sentencing) guidelines have merely
shifted discretion from parole boards, prison o±cials, and judges to prosecutors." How-
ever, this report goes on to say that, \Little evidence exists to document how much this
(shifting of discretion) has occurred."
Understanding the role of prosecutorial discretion with respect to mandatory min-
imum sentencing laws is important for two primary reasons. First, any future legisla-
tive policy regarding sentencing guidelines must take into account the degree to which
the e®ects of these guidelines will be a®ected by the mitigating actions available to
agents within the court, speci¯cally prosecutors (Eisenstein et al, 1988). Second, under-
standing the role of prosecutorial discretion is important with regards to the theoretical
crime literature. Most theoretical crime models assume lawmakers can determine both
1As noted in Tonry (1996), departure from mandatory sentences and sentencing guidelines are low,
and in general, judges much more often than not impose sentences that comply with applicable guidelines.
Similarly, Anderson et al (1999) ¯nd a signi¯cant decrease in sentence length variation between judges
after the imposition of mandatory sentencing laws.
2the probability of conviction and the sentence given conviction, and that ¯nding and
convicting another criminal is relatively more expensive than increasing the sentence
imposed on a convicted criminal. As discussed by Becker (1968) and others, e±cient
deterrence in such a world is to impose the maximal possible sentence on all individuals
convicted for each crime, but to ¯nd and convict only a minimal number of o®enders.
But, if lawmakers do not have absolute authority in determining how arrested o®enders
are sentenced, then the above result will not hold. As shown by Andreoni (1991) and
Frazoni (1999), when agents in the judicial system have some discretion over sentencing
beyond that of legislators, it may be more socially e±cient to attempt to make sentences
re°ect the social cost of the crime.
This paper adds to the literature on mandatory minimum sentencing laws in two
primary ways. First, it provides formal empirical evidence documenting that one way
in which prosecutors react to these laws is by systematically becoming more likely to
prosecute those arrested for crimes targeted by these laws for lesser crimes not covered
by these laws. Speci¯cally, with respect to one type of mandatory minimum sentencing
law, namely \three-strikes" type repeat serious o®ender laws, I show that, following
the imposition of these laws, prosecutors become almost twice as likely to prosecute
\three-strikes arrestees" for lesser misdemeanor crimes not covered by the laws.2 More-
over, further results suggest that such behavior is the result of prosecutors using their
discretion to partially circumvent three-strikes laws due to their own constraints and
preferences, not in response to changes in behavior by other actors within the judicial
system.
The second contribution of this paper is to show the importance of accounting for this
type of prosecutorial discretion over prosecution charges when estimating the e®ects of
mandatory minimum sentencing laws on average sentencing. With respect to the three-
strikes laws examined here, I show that failing to account for the type of prosecutorial
discretion discussed above will lead to substantially overstating the e®ect of these laws
on average sentencing. In particular, a naive estimate of the e®ect of these laws, where
2\Three-strikes arrestees" being those defendants whose current arrest charge and criminal history
¯t the criteria for being prosecuted under his state's three-strike law.
3the ability of prosecutors to selectively lessen prosecution charges is not accounted for,
will tend to overstate the e®ect of these laws on average sentencing by almost thirty
percent.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, Section 2 reviews the re-
cent empirical literature on the role of prosecutorial discretion with respect to mandatory
minimum sentencing laws. Next, Section 3 attempts to empirically estimate the extent
to which prosecutors appear to alter their use of discretion over prosecution charges
in response three-strikes type repeat o®ender sentencing laws. Section 4 discusses in
more detail what might be the underlying motivation behind the change in prosecutor
behavior documented in the previous section. Section 5 then shows the importance of
accounting for prosecutor discretion when estimating the e®ect of three-strikes laws on
sentencing. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Previous Literature Regarding the E®ects of Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing Laws
As discussed in the introduction, many mandatory minimum sentencing laws have been
implemented throughout the United States over the last couple of decades. This section
reviews the ¯ndings and conclusions of some of the more recent literature related to
prosecutor behavior with respect to these laws.
At the Federal level, the United States Sentencing Commission (U.S.S.C., 1991)
found that of a sample of defendants whose arrest o®enses appeared to be covered by
one of the Federal mandatory minimum sentencing laws imposed in the late 1980s, over
25 percent were tried or sentenced under alternate charges that either had lower or no
mandatory minimum sentence. The U.S.S.C. also found that for 45 percent of drug de-
fendants for whom weapons enhancements were found appropriate, no weapons charges
were ¯led. Moreover, for 63 percent of defendants for whom increased punishments
were possible due to prior felony convictions, increased minimums were not sought or
obtained.
At the state level, Tonry (1996) summarizes the ¯ndings concerning three of the state
4mandatory sentencing laws that have been most thoroughly examined|the Rockefeller
Drug Laws in New York, Massachusetts' Bartley-Fox Amendment, and the Michigan
Felony Firearms Statute.
The Rockefeller Laws, implemented in 1973, prescribed severe mandatory minimum
prison sentences for most narcotics o®enses. In examining the e®ect of these laws, a 1978
Joint Committee on New York Drug Laws found that (a) drug felony arrests, indictment
rates, and conviction rates all declined after the law took e®ect, (b) for those who were
convicted for a drug felony, both the likelihood of being imprisoned and the average
length of prison term increased, and (c) the actual likelihood of prison given arrest for
a drug felony was unchanged after the Rockefeller Laws were enacted.
Massachusetts' Bartley-Fox Amendment required a one-year mandatory minimum
prison sentence for anyone convicted of carrying an unlawful ¯rearm, regardless of
whether any other crime was committed. Studies that have examined the e®ects of
this law in detail (Beha, 1977; Rossman et al, 1979) ¯nd that after the law took e®ect
(a) dismissals and acquittals increased, (b) the percentage of defendants initially charged
with illegal ¯rearm possession who avoided conviction of this crime rose from 53.5 per-
cent in 1974 (before the passage of the amendment) to 80 percent in 1976 (after the
passage of the amendment), and (c) the probability of incarceration for those o®enders
actually convicted of illegal ¯rearm possession rose from 23 percent to 100 percent.
Finally, the Michigan Felony Firearms Statute mandated a minimum two-year prison
sentence for possession of a ¯rearm while engaging in any felony. Studies of this statute
found that ¯rearm charges were only ¯led in 65 percent of a sample of eligible cases
(Bynum, 1982) and that the statute did not generally increase the probability of being
incarcerated given arrest, but did increase the expected sentences for those sentenced to
incarceration (Loftin et al, 1983).
Although the ¯ndings from these studies are consistent with several theories of be-
havior, in interpreting these ¯ndings Tonry (1996) states, \(t)he people who operate the
criminal justice system generally ¯nd mandatory minimum sentencing laws too in°exible
for their taste and take steps to avoid what they consider unduly harsh, and therefore,
unjust, sentences," and that \(p)rosecutors often avoid application of mandatory sen-
5tencing laws simply by ¯ling charges for di®erent, but roughly comparable, o®enses
that are not subject to mandatory sentences."3 The idea that mandatory minimum
sentencing laws cause actors in the judicial system, particularly prosecutors, to change
their behavior in order to mitigate the e®ects of these laws, is not a new one. In fact,
one of the main reasons Congress repealed almost all of the existing mandatory federal
sentences for drug o®enses in 1970 was because there was a feeling that \the severity
of existing penalties, involving in many instances minimum mandatory sentences, has
led in many instances to reluctance on the part of the prosecutors to prosecute some
violations, where penalties seem to be out of line with the seriousness of the o®enses."4
While these studies provide a good deal of anecdotal and descriptive evidence regard-
ing prosecutor behavior and defendant outcomes following the imposition of mandatory
minimum sentencing laws, most do not provide rigorous statistical analyses document-
ing how prosecutor behavior adjusts to mandatory minimum sentencing laws. More
speci¯cally, the studies discussed above do not explicitly test the statistical signi¯cance
of any changes in prosecutor behavior following the imposition of the minimum sentenc-
ing laws, or test whether these behavioral changes were directed primarily toward only
those defendants targeted by the sentencing laws.5
Kessler and Piehl (1998) use more rigorous statistical methods in their evaluation of
3Other evidence and similar conclusions can be found in Knapp (1991), Eisenstein, Flemming and
Narduli (1988).
4House of Representatives 1970, quoted from U.S. Sentencing Commission 1991, pp. 6-7.
5A variety of other papers have done more formal statistical analyses of the e®ects of mandatory
minimum sentencing laws such as Lacasse and Payne (1999), Anderson, Kling, and Stith (1999), Marvell
and Moody (2001), and Shepard (2002). However, these studies are not directly related to this study
in that their primary focus was not related to how prosecutors altered their behavior in reaction to
mandatory minimum sentencing laws. Lacasse and Payne (1999) do ¯nd indirect evidence suggesting
that the role of prosecutors could be large with respect to mandatory minimum sentencing laws, in that
the plea bargain rate increased following the imposition of Federal sentencing guidelines in the judicial
districts they examine, and plea bargained sentences were signi¯cantly related to both the mean and
variance of the sentences handed down by the judge assigned to the case|evidence they interpret as
showing that judges retain enough discretion following the imposition of the sentencing guidelines such
that prosecutors can still exploit the variation in this discretion across judges in their plea bargaining
negotiations.
6the e®ects of California's Proposition 8, a repeat o®ender mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing law passed in 1982. The data set they used for their analysis contained individual
level information for convicted criminals committed to incarceration between 1981 and
1985.6 From this data, they ¯rst determined the sentence length imposed on each con-
vict, what crime each convict was charged with, whether or not the convict had been
convicted before, and whether each convict was arrested before or after the imposition
of Proposition 8. Then for three di®erent types of crime, they tested the degree to which
the law changed the mean sentence for those defendants with criminal histories relative
to any contemporaneous changes in the sentencing for those without criminal histories
charged with the same crime. Kessler and Piehl found that for those charged with
Robbery, a crime eligible for sentencing under Proposition 8, the expected sentence for
repeat o®enders increased by over 50 percent relative to non-repeat o®enders subsequent
to the passage of Proposition 8. They also found that the expected sentence for repeat
o®enders charged with Grand Larceny, a similar but lesser crime than Robbery that was
not covered by Proposition 8, also showed a small but signi¯cant increase relative to
non-repeat o®enders following passage of the sentencing law. By contrast, the expected
sentence for repeat o®enders charged with drug possession, a crime not eligible for sen-
tencing under Proposition 8, actually decreased slightly relative to non-repeat o®enders
following the imposition of Proposition 8.
Like Tonry (1996), Kessler and Piehl interpret their results as showing that pros-
ecutor discretion can play an important role following the imposition of a mandatory
minimum sentencing law. However, Kessler and Piehl's conclusions di®er from Tonry
concerning the speci¯c way in which prosecutorial discretion matters. While Tonry em-
phasizes prosecutors using their discretion to mitigate the overall e®ect of mandatory
minimum sentencing laws on actual sentencing, Kessler and Piehl generally view their
evidence as showing that prosecutors use their discretion to increase the sentences of
defendants who committed lesser, but similar crimes not covered by the new laws. In
concluding, they say their ¯ndings suggest \increases in statutory sentences result in
more punishment, not less punishment, than the simple statement of the laws would
6Their data came from California Board of Prison Terms.
7suggest," and that their ¯ndings reject \the null hypothesis that actors in the criminal
justice system seek to undo changes in laws."
3 The Reaction of Prosecutors to Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing Laws
While Kessler and Piehl's (1998) interpretation of their evidence is somewhat at odds
with Tonry's (1996) conclusions, their actual ¯ndings do not necessarily provide evi-
dence against the mitigating behavior on the part of prosecutors as suggested by Tonry.
Speci¯cally, Kessler and Piehl's analysis does not directly examine whether prosecu-
tors alter their use of discretion over prosecution charges following implementation of
the sentencing law. Hence, their results do not directly contradict (or support for that
matter) the type of prosecutorial discretion emphasized by Tonry. Moreover, their data
contains only individuals who were convicted and sentenced to jail time, meaning their
sample is a very select sample of all individuals arrested for the crimes they examine,
and furthermore, it is unclear at what point in the judicial process their charge data
refers to. As will be discussed below, it is extremely important to distinguish between
the initial arrest charge and the eventual charge for which a defendant is prosecuted. In
the empirical analysis that follows, I attempt to more directly examine whether prosecu-
tors use their discretion over prosecution charges to circumvent one type of mandatory
minimum sentencing law|namely the state \three-strikes" type repeat serious o®ender
laws passed throughout the 1990s.
3.1 Data and De¯nitions
The data used for this analysis comes from State Court Processing Statistics 1990-1996
(Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties). This Bureau of Justice Statistics data set
tracks a sample of defendants arrested for state felony o®enses, weighted to be represen-
tative the nation's 75 most populous counties. The data set contains detailed information
for each individual's case, including the date of arrest, the initial arrest charge, whether
the individual was prosecuted for a felony or a misdemeanor, demographic and criminal
8history characteristics of the defendant, the ¯nal disposition of the case, any conviction
charges, and any sentence imposed. The general sample used in this paper consists of all
cases that were not pending, and contained valid data regarding the arrest charge, the
prosecution charge, the adjudication outcome, and any eventual conviction charges.7
As stated above, the laws I will examine in this analysis are several state \three-
strikes" sentencing laws that were passed throughout the 1990s. Although there are
substantial di®erences in the particular laws passed in each of the states, the general
purpose of these laws was similar: they were meant to impose prison sentences on serious
repeat o®enders for longer periods of time than the existing laws dictated. As shown in
Table 1(a), between 1990 and 1996, some version of a three-strikes law passed in 12 of
the 24 states contained in the data set used here.
As can be seen in Table 1(b), these three-strikes laws cover many di®erent crimes and
have very di®erent eligibility criteria. Therefore, unlike laws targeting gun possession
or drug sales, determining which individuals in the data set were arrested for and/or
convicted for the \crimes" targeted by the three-strikes laws is not straightforward. To
make this determination, for each state in the data set that passed a three-strikes type
sentencing law between 1990 and 1996, the crimes covered by the law and the criminal
history required by the law were used to de¯ne the criteria that an individual must
meet to be eligible for the law in that state. If an individual's initial arrest charge and
criminal history appear to satisfy the criteria for his or her home state's three-strike
law, then this individual is said to be in the group arrested for a three-strikes crime.
Similarly, if an individual's conviction charge and criminal history appear to satisfy the
criteria for his or her home state's three-strike law, this individual is said to be in the
group convicted for a three-strikes crime.
One constraint of this data set is that the information regarding arrest (conviction)
charges and prior criminal history is not as speci¯c as the criteria speci¯ed by the
7Here and throughout the paper, \Arrest charge" refers to the most serious charge ¯rst ¯led with the
lower court. \Prosecution charge" comes from the variable termed \adjudicated level" in the data set.
This refers to the level (misdemeanor or felony) of the most serious charge that had not been dropped
or dismissed by the time the case was adjudicated.
9three-strike laws. In particular, while the State Court Processing Statistics data set
categorizes arrest and conviction charges according to only 14 di®erent crime categories,
there are many more arrest and conviction charge possibilities in the actual judicial
system. Moreover, while the judicial system knows extensive details concerning each
arrested individual's criminal history, the criminal history data captured by the data set
only includes the number of previous felony convictions, the number of previous violent
felony convictions, the number of previous misdemeanor convictions, and the number of
previous jail or prison stays. Table 1(b) shows how I dealt with these constraints when
de¯ning who was arrested (convicted) for a three-strikes crime. For example, the Florida
three-strikes law states that a defendant is eligible for three-strikes sentencing if he is
convicted three times for any of the following crimes: any forcible felony, aggravated
stalking, aggravated child abuse, lewd or indecent conduct, and escape. However, for
this analysis, a defendant from Florida is coded to have been arrested (convicted) for a
three-strike crime if his arrest (conviction) charge is for murder, rape, robbery, assault,
or another violent crime, and he had two or more prior violent felony convictions.
Note that the above de¯nitions imply that a defendant with an arrest (conviction)
charge and a criminal history that ¯t his or her state's three-strike law is said to be
arrested (convicted) for a three-strike crime regardless of whether he or she was arrested
before or after the three-strike law was passed. In this way these laws are treated
like mandatory minimum sentencing laws targeting other crimes, such as drug sales or
¯rearms possession, where the targeted crime was de¯ned both before and after the law.
Also, note that since these laws di®er across states, the above de¯nitions imply that
defendants arrested (convicted) for the same crime and with the same criminal history
need not both be said to be arrested (convicted) for a three-strikes crime if they come
from di®erent home states and their home states' three-strikes laws di®er. Furthermore,
since a defendant needs to both be arrested (convicted) for a crime covered by his or
her state's three-strikes law and have the criminal history that ¯ts his or her state's
three-strikes law, defendants who are from the same state and both arrested (convicted)
for a crime covered by their state's three-strikes law, may not both be said to be arrested
(convicted) for a three-strikes crime if they have di®erent criminal histories.
10It is important to note that there is likely to be considerable measurement error
concerning who is de¯ned to be \arrested (convicted) for a three-strike crime" versus
those who are de¯ned to be \arrested (convicted) for other crimes." As mentioned pre-
viously, the actual criteria required to be eligible for three-strikes sentencing is generally
more speci¯c than what is contained in the State Court Processing Data used here. This
means that some individuals are likely classi¯ed as being arrested for a three-strike crime
when they should not be, and some individuals are classi¯ed as being arrested for an
\other" crime, when they should be in the three-strike group. Such measurement error
will mean that any di®erences in outcomes between those classi¯ed as being arrested for
three-strike crimes and those arrested for \other" crimes will likely understate the true
di®erences in outcomes between these two groups.
Finally, note that because of how I de¯ned the group of defendants arrested for three-
strikes crimes, the group of defendants arrested for other felonies besides three-strikes
crimes are not always arrested for lesser crimes. However, as can be seen in Table 2,
defendants arrested for three-strikes crimes are more likely to have been arrested for
violent crimes, had more lengthy criminal histories, were given longer jail sentences, and
were less likely to be prosecuted for misdemeanors, than defendants arrested for other
felonies.8
3.2 Empirical Evaluation of Prosecutor Response to Three-Strike Laws
As discussed above, if prosecutors have discretion over prosecution charges, they may
respond to a law increasing the mandatory minimum sentence for certain crimes by
prosecuting a greater fraction of those arrested for the targeted crimes for lesser crimes
not covered by the law. In order to examine whether such behavior occurs with re-
spect to these three-strikes laws, we need to estimate how the proportion of individuals
arrested for three-strikes crimes that are prosecuted for lesser non-three-strikes crimes
changes following the imposition of the three-strikes laws. The di±culty in performing
this analysis is that the data set used here does not provide speci¯c information on
8In this table and in all subsequent tables, statistics are weighted using the weights provided by the
State Court Processing Statistics to be representative of the nation's 75 most populous counties.
11the prosecution charge. Rather, it only provides information concerning whether the
defendant was prosecuted for a felony or a misdemeanor. However, since all defendants
in the data set were arrested for felonies, and none of the three-strike laws apply to
misdemeanors, any defendant in this data set who was prosecuted for a misdemeanor
can be said to have been prosecuted for a lesser crime than his or her initial arrest
charge, and prosecuted for a crime that was not eligible for three-strikes sentencing.
Therefore, in analyzing whether three-strike laws appear to cause prosecutors to raise
the severity level standard required to prosecute an individual for three-strike crimes,
I examine whether there is an increase in the proportion of three-strikes arrestees who
were prosecuted for misdemeanors following the imposition of the three-strikes laws.
Once again, this de¯nition of \lesser" crimes as being misdemeanors will tend to
cause measurement error in the true group of interest, as in many states prosecutors can
choose to prosecute individuals arrested for three-strikes crimes for other lesser felonies
not covered by their states' three-strikes laws. Since such individuals will be erroneously
evaluated as being both arrested and prosecuted for a three-strike crime in this analysis,
such measurement error will generally cause the results in this paper to understate the
true degree to which prosecutors alter their use of discretion over prosecution charges in
response to three-strike laws. In other words, the results discussed below likely provide
a lower bound estimate on the degree to which prosecutors respond to three-strikes laws
by prosecuting eligible individuals for lesser crimes not covered by the laws.
Table 3 shows the proportions of felony defendants prosecuted for misdemeanors
before and after the imposition of the three-strikes laws for di®erent groups. The ¯rst
row reports that the proportion of defendants arrested for three-strikes crimes who were
prosecuted for misdemeanors rose from 5.5 percent before the passage of the three-strike
laws, to 9.3 percent after the passage of the three-strike laws. This change represents an
increase of over 70 percent.9 By comparison, of the defendants residing in states that
passed three-strikes laws but who were arrested for other felonies besides three-strike
crimes, the proportion prosecuted for misdemeanors stayed roughly constant, moving
from 12.9 percent before the passage of the three-strike laws, to 12.2 percent after the
9This increase is statistically signi¯cant at the one percent level.
12passage of the three-strike laws. As shown in the last row in Table 3, this means that,
relative other felony defendants, defendants arrested for three-strikes crimes became 4.5
percentage points more likely to be prosecuted for a lesser misdemeanor charge following
the imposition of the three-strikes laws. This increase is statistically signi¯cant at the
one percent level.10
To ensure that the result in Table 3 is robust to state speci¯c e®ects, time trends,
and changes in the demographic, criminal history, and/or judicial status composition
of the group arrested for three-strikes crimes, I estimated several probit speci¯cations
controlling for these factors. These speci¯cations use data from all states in the data set,
not just those that passed three-strikes laws. The dependant variable in each speci¯ca-
tion is a binary variable equaling one if the defendant was prosecuted for a misdemeanor
and zero if prosecuted for a felony. Control variables consist of a dummy variable equal-
ing one if the defendant was arrested for a three-strike crime after the passage of the
three-strikes law in his or her state, a dummy variable equaling one if the defendant was
arrested for a three-strike crime, a dummy variable equaling one if the defendant was
arrested after a three-strike law was passed in his or her state, as well as a variety of
controls for the defendant's demographic characteristics, criminal history, arrest charge,
judicial status at time of arrest, and year and state of arrest.11 Furthermore, in the ¯nal
speci¯cation, standard errors are clustered by year within each state in order to take
into account that observations within a state in a speci¯c year may not be statistically
10It is worth noting that if the sample is limited to only those counties that appear in the data
set every year, the results here and throughout the paper stay essentially unchanged with only small
increases in standard errors. For example, if the sample is limited to only those counties that appear
in each year, the proportion of defendants arrested for three-strikes crimes who were prosecuted for
misdemeanors rose from 4.2 percent (standard error of 0.007) before the passage of the three-strike
laws, to 10.1 percent (standard error of 0.017) after the passage of the three-strike laws. Similarly, the
proportion of individuals arrested for \other" felonies in three-strikes states moves from 10.6 percent
(standard error 0.003) before the imposition of the laws, to 10.5 percent (standard error 0.005) after the
imposition of the laws. In general, it is the relatively small counties that do not show up in the data set
every year.
11Dummy variables for missing observations for each control variable were also included.
13independent even after controlling for the variables discussed above.12
The numbers in the top row of Table 4 corresponding to \Arrested for 3-strikes
(post-law)" show the estimated increase in the probability of being prosecuted for a
misdemeanor for those defendants arrested for a three-strikes crime after a passage of
a three-strike law. These coe±cients show that, after controlling for any compositional
changes in the group of defendants arrested for three-strikes crimes, as well as state and
year e®ects, defendants arrested for three-strikes crimes were roughly 8 percentage points
more likely to have been prosecuted for a misdemeanor if arrested after the passage of
the three-strikes laws.13
Of all the three-strikes laws passed throughout the time period examined here, Cal-
ifornia's was not only one of the most broadly targeted, but also one of the most severe
in terms of penalties it prescribed. Because of this, any behavioral changes by California
prosecutors or other actors in the California judicial system in response to this law may
have been signi¯cantly larger than analogous changes in other states. Since California
also contributes the most three-strikes defendants to the data set, it is important to
assess whether the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 are simply picking up radical changes
in California. However, this does not appear to be the case, as Table 5 shows that the
changes in prosecution charges following the implementation of a three-strikes law are
similar in California to the other three-strikes states.14 Hence, results shown in Tables
12Thanks to Rosalie Pacula and Abigail Payne for suggesting this adjustment.
13In order to show the change in the marginal probability of being prosecuted for a misdemeanor, the
coe±cient corresponding to each control variable j equals ^ ¯jÁ(X ^ ¯), where the ^ ¯j is the estimated probit
coe±cient on control variable j and Á(X ^ ¯) the pdf of the standard normal distribution evaluated at the
mean of the dependant variables. The standard errors shown below these coe±cients in parentheses are
all normalized in the same manner.
14Probit speci¯cations identical to those shown in Table 3 (dependant variable being a dummy for
whether or not the defendant was prosecuted for a misdemeanor) were also done for just California
and all states besides California. In both cases, I ¯nd that those defendants arrested for a three-strike
crime after the passage of the three-strikes law in their state are more likely (signi¯cant at the 5 and
10 percent level respectively) to be prosecuted for a misdemeanor than those defendants arrested for a
three-strike crime prior to the passage of the three-strikes law in their state. Complete results available
upon request.
143 and 4 do not appear to be driven soley by changes in the California judicial process
following the imposition of the California three-strikes laws.
4 Why do Prosecutors Lessen Prosecution Charges for
Three-Strike Arrestees?
The ¯ndings presented above show that three-strikes arrestees become more likely to be
prosecuted for lesser charges than their arrest charges, when conviction for the arrest
charge would lead to sentencing under a three-strikes mandatory minimum sentencing
law. This ¯nding is certainly consistent with much of the studies discussed previously
that emphasize prosecutors (or prosecutor o±ces) attempting to circumvent mandatory
minimum sentencing laws for some defendants due to their own preferences and con-
straints. However, it may also be true that these these apparent changes in prosecutor
behavior are simply an outcome or response to changes in criminal, police, judge, jury,
and/or defense attorney behavior. This section attempts to examine this issue in more
detail.
4.1 Direct Evidence Concerning Prosecutorial Discretion
The California three-strikes law not only covers a broader range of defendants and
proscribes harsher sentences than most other states, but it also provides prosecutors
with another method for circumventing the three-strikes law not generally available (at
least o±cially) in other states. Speci¯cally, California prosecutors can circumvent the
California three-strikes law uno±cially by lessening the prosecution charge in the manner
described above, or o±cially, by dropping a previous strike.15
Walsh (1999) examines the criteria California prosecutors use when deciding for
whom to apply this added discretion over previous strikes. In a direct survey of District
15In the context of the California three-strikes law, the California legislature authorized prosecutors
\to dismiss or strike a prior felony allegation in the furtherance of justice" (California Penal Code
x667(f)(2)). Moreover, by dropping a strike, the strike is only not counted against the defendant for the
current charge, not dropped from his record altogether.
15Attorney o±ces in 25 of the 58 California counties (accounting for over 75 percent of
the state's total share of three-strike convictions), Walsh ¯nds that 92 percent of these
District Attorney o±ces had used their discretion to drop a strike in a three-strike case.
The most common reason given by the DA o±ces for why they would choose to strike a
previous three-strikes conviction in a three-strike case was that the arrest o®ense \was
trivial in nature" (74%), followed by the prior strikes being \remote in time" (65%),
\defendant has no recent criminal history" (65%), and \prior strikes all from singular
incident" (65%).16 \Case likely to end in Acquittal" placed 8th out of the 10 choices
with 43.5%. Hence, California prosecutors choose to circumvent the three-strikes law
by striking previous strike convictions for defendants who are arrested for lesser crimes
and have more remote and less serious criminal histories.
If it is believed that prosecutors use similar criteria as above when choosing to lessen
prosecution charges, then Walsh's ¯ndings support the notion that the changes in pros-
ecution charge outcomes shown in the previous section are the result of prosecutors
attempting to circumvent three-strikes laws due to their own constraints and prefer-
ences. Moreover, this ability of California prosecutors to elect to strike a previous strike
may also help resolve a further question that arises from Table 5 with respect to this
theory. Namely, given the relative strength of the California law, and if prosecutors
use their charging discretion to circumvent three-strikes laws, then why don't California
prosecutors appear change their prosecution behavior more drastically than prosecutors
in other three-strikes states?
The answer to this question may be that this ability to strike a previous strike means
that even if California prosecutors attempt to circumvent their three-strikes law more
often than prosecutors in other states, California prosecutors are not necessarily more
likely to lessen prosecution charges in order to do so, as they have this other o±cial
method at their disposal. However, it is certainly possible that prosecutors in other
states besides California ¯nd less o±cial ways to drop prior strikes in order to mitigate
16DA o±ces were allowed to select more than one reason for why they would strike a previous convic-
tion.
16the impact of three-strikes laws.17 Therefore, the above discussion simply reveals that
lessening prosecution charges may be one of several ways in which prosecutors can use
their discretion in an e®ort to circumvent three-strikes laws. Therefore, the similarity
between changes in prosecution practices in California and other three-strikes states is
not necessarily surprising.18
4.2 Changes in Criminal and Police Behavior
One stated motivation for three-strikes laws has often been to increase the expected sen-
tence for repeat o®enders committing serious crimes, in order to deter repeat o®enders
from committing another serious crime. Given this deterrence goal, the question can
be asked whether the increase in the proportion of three-strikes defendants prosecuted
for misdemeanors following the imposition of the three-strikes laws re°ects changes in
the behavior of some repeat criminals and/or changes in police arresting behavior, not
prosecutors attempting to circumvent the laws. For example, if the laws deter repeat
o®enders from committing the more serious three-strikes crimes,19 then the group ar-
rested for three-strikes crimes should be comprised of a \less severe" group of o®enders
17Thank you to an anonymous referee for highlighting this point.
18The reasons why California prosecutors would choose to circumvent the three-strikes laws through
lessening the prosecution charge rather than dropping a strike are unclear, however such behavior may
be related to the fact that the California law a®ects both three-strike and two-strike defendants. In
particular, Table 1(a) shows how the law a®ects sentencing after two convictions for the covered crimes,
and how the law a®ects sentencing after three convictions for the covered crimes. One reason a California
prosecutor may choose to lessen the prosecution charge is to not only avoid a sentencing under the law
for the current crime, but also to not provide a further strike that will ensure sentencing under the
law if the defendant is convicted for another covered crime in the future. For example, if a California
defendant already has one strike against him and is arrested for another crime covered by the law, then
to avoid the sentencing law, the prosecutor can either prosecute him for a lesser crime, or drop a strike.
If a strike is dropped, then the defendant will not be sentenced under the law for this crime, but will be
sentenced under the law if he is convicted of another felony at any time in the future (since he now has
two strikes and only one at most can be dropped). However, if the prosecution charge is lowered for the
second arrest, then he will still only have one strike against him on any subsequent felony arrests.
19Alternatively, say police become less likely to arrest repeat o®enders committing the more serious
three-strikes crimes.
17after the law than before. Then, even if prosecutors did not change their behavior con-
cerning how \serious" a repeat o®ender defendant must be in order to be prosecuted for
a felony, a greater proportion of defendants arrested for three-strikes crimes would be
prosecuted for misdemeanors following the imposition of the three-strikes laws. Hence,
rather than a changing severity standard necessary to be prosecuted for a three-strikes
crime, deterrence e®ects that result in compositional changes in the group arrested for
three-strikes crimes could possibly explain the ¯ndings shown in Tables 3 and 4.
However, the deterrence e®ects of three-strikes laws are more likely work in the
opposite direction than posited in the previous paragraph. Three-strikes laws should
have a greater deterrence e®ect on repeat o®enders thinking of committing less serious
three-strike crimes than more serious ones, since the lesser crimes are presumably only
marginally worthwhile without the law.20 Therefore, if anything, the group of three-
strikes defendants is likely to be composed of a more severe group of o®enders after the
law than before the law. Without changes prosecutor behavior, such a compositional
change would lead to fewer three-strikes arrestees being prosecuted for misdemeanors
after the law than before the law. A result inconsistent with the results shown in Tables
3 and 4.
More generally, regressing the proportion of defendants in the data set who were
arrested for three-strikes crimes in each year in each state on a dummy for whether
a three-strike law had yet been passed in that state, a dummy for whether a three-
strike law was ever passed in that state, and year dummies, shows little evidence for
substantial deterrence. The coe±cient on the dummy variable for whether a three-strike
law had yet been passed is insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero, indicating the proportion
of defendants arrested for three-strikes crimes within a state did not change signi¯cantly
after the passage of a three-strikes law.
Moreover, Table 6 shows that there are very few signi¯cant changes in the character-
20For example, a repeat o®ender street dealer may become less likely to continue dealing if he knows
that if caught he may receive a life sentence, but a drug lord is not likely to reconsider his dealing plans
due to a three-strikes law. Similarly, if a repeat o®ender robber decides to commit a robbery after the
passage of the law it should provide a greater reward given the higher sentencing risk.
18istics of the group of defendants arrested for three-strikes crimes following the imposition
of the three-strikes laws. In fact, relative to contemporaneous changes in the compo-
sition of defendants arrested for other felonies in three-strikes states, the passage of
three-strikes laws did not signi¯cantly alter the composition of the group arrested for
three-strikes crimes on any relevant dimension except a slightly greater proportion ar-
rested for drug crimes. However, this increase in the proportion of three-strikes arrestees
arrested for drug crimes is not large enough to account for the change in prosecutor be-
havior. This can be seen in Table 7, which shows the results of an analysis identical
to that presented in Table 3, but without those individuals arrested for drug crimes.
The results shown in Table 7 are almost identical to those in Table 3. This means the
increase in the proportion of three-strikes arrestees arrested for drug crimes following
the imposition of the three-strike laws does not drive the earlier ¯ndings concerning
changes in misdemeanor prosecutions.
While this evidence is clearly not conclusive of no deterrence e®ects associated with
three-strikes laws, a lack of deterrence with respect to these laws is plausible for several
reasons. First, the particulars of each of the laws may make it di±cult for repeat serious
o®enders to be able to properly calculate the change in the expected cost to further
criminal behavior. Moreover, it may take several years for criminals to adjust their
behavior to changes in sentencing policy, and these deterrence e®ects have not had time
to manifest themselves post-law time frame available with this data. Finally, repeat
o®enders may discount their future so heavily and/or be such poor decision makers,
that even substantial changes in sentencing does not e®ect their behavior.
4.3 Changes in Judge and Jury Behavior
Another argument concerning the results shown in Tables 3 and 4 is that these results
may not be due to prosecutors using their discretion to circumvent the laws for some
defendants, but rather due to prosecutors adjusting their behavior in response to changes
in judge and/or jury behavior. Speci¯cally, juries may react to three-strikes laws by
becoming less likely to convict all defendants prosecuted for three-strikes crimes after
the passage of the law. Similarly, judges may react to the law by using their control over
19the judicial proceedings to make it more di±cult to convict any defendant prosecuted
for three-strikes crimes after the passage of the law.
If it is true that changes in judge or jury behavior cause the conviction rates for
three-strikes prosecutions to fall following the imposition of three-strikes laws, then
prosecutors may decide to prosecute a greater proportion of three-strikes arrestees for
misdemeanors not in order to avoid the law, but rather to avoid the now uniformly higher
acquittal probability associated with three-strikes prosecution charges. To attempt eval-
uate whether this explanation is true, I examine whether individuals prosecuted for a
three-strikes crimes are more likely to be acquitted in a trial following the imposition of
the three-strikes laws.
Table 8 presents the results of several probit analyses estimating the e®ect of several
defendant characteristics on the probability of acquittal, where the sample includes
data from all states (not just the three-strike states) but is restricted to only those
defendants whose case was resolved through a jury or bench trial. In each speci¯cation,
the dependant variable equals one if the defendant was acquitted and zero otherwise,
with control variables consisting of a dummy variable equalling one if the defendant
was from a state that passed a three-strikes law, a dummy variable equalling one if the
defendant was arrested for a three-strikes crime, a dummy variable equalling one if the
defendant was arrested after the passage of a three-strikes crime in the defendant's home
state, and a dummy variable equalling one if the defendant was arrested for a three-strike
crime after the passage of a three-strike law in his or her home state. The additional
speci¯cations also control for various other defendant characteristics that could in°uence
conviction rates.
The negative and statistically insigni¯cant coe±cients corresponding to \Arrested
for 3-strike crime (post-law)" in the top row of Table 8 show that defendants prosecuted
for three-strikes crimes are no more likely to be acquitted after the imposition of the
three-strikes laws than before. Moreover, the latter speci¯cations show that this result
is true even after controlling for a variety of other defendant characteristics that may
a®ect conviction rates and may be changing over time due to changes in which defendants
prosecutors decide to bring to trial.
20While these results are consistent with the hypothesis that judges and juries do
not change their behavior with respect to convicting three-strikes defendants after the
passage of three-strikes laws, they are by no means conclusive. Speci¯cally, if prosecutors
alter their decision of who to bring before a jury in response to juries becoming less
likely to convict less severe defendants being prosecuted for three-strikes crimes, then it
should be expected that conviction rates for three-strikes defendants would not change
drastically following the implementation of the laws.
While this argument undoubtedly makes the lack of an signi¯cant coe±cients on the
\Arrested for 3-strike crime (post-law)" variable insu±cient for fully analyzing changes
in jury behavior following the implementation of three-strikes laws, these empirical ¯nd-
ings are not without value. Speci¯cally, a ¯nding of a signi¯cant positive coe±cient on
this variable would have made it hard to believe that the results shown in Table 3 were
not due to prosecutors reacting to juries changing their behavior following the passage of
three-strikes laws. Moreover, speci¯cations 3 and 4 in Table 8 show that even after con-
trolling for a variety of defendant characteristics, individuals arrested for three-strikes
crimes are no more likely to be acquitted by a jury after the passage of a three-strikes
law. Hence, for the changes in charging outcomes to be soley due to prosecutors respond-
ing to changes in judge and jury behavior, any changes in the composition of the group
of three-strikes defendants that prosecutors decide to bring to trial must be orthogonal
to all of the various defendant characteristics accounted for in speci¯cations 4 and 5.
This presents an additional assumption that must be made in order to believe that the
results documented in Tables 3 and 4 are primarily the result of prosecutors reacting to
changes in judge or jury behavior following the imposition of the three-strikes laws.
4.4 Changes in Defense Attorney Behavior
Another possibility is that the ¯nding that three-strikes arrestees become more likely
to be prosecuted for misdemeanors after the imposition of the three-strikes laws is not
because of any changes in prosecutor behavior, but rather is due to changes in defense
attorney behavior. More speci¯cally, prosecutors may have o®ered misdemeanor plea
bargain opportunities at the similar rates before and after the imposition of the three-
21strikes laws, but because of the longer sentences associated with conviction for three-
strikes crimes following the imposition of the three-strike laws, defense lawyers (and
their clients) may simply become more likely to accept these misdemeanor plea bargain
o®ers after the imposition of the three-strikes laws. It is then this higher acceptance rate
that accounts for the increased likelihood that three-strikes arrestees are prosecuted for
misdemeanors following the imposition of the three-strikes laws.
However, the probit results summarized in Table 9 suggest that this story also is
not necessarily the case. In each speci¯cation, the dependant variable equals one if the
case is resolved through a plea bargain and zero otherwise, and the control variables are
similar to before, with a dummy variable equalling one if the defendant was from a state
that passed a three-strikes law, a dummy variable equalling one if the defendant was
arrested for a three-strikes crime, a dummy variable equalling one if the defendant was
arrested after the passage of a three-strikes crime in the defendant's home state, and
a dummy variable equalling one if the defendant was arrested for a three-strike crime
after the passage of a three-strike law in his or her home state, as well as controls for
other defendant characteristics in the additional speci¯cations. As can be seen from
the ¯rst row of coe±cients, those defendants arrested for three-strikes crimes did not
become any more likely to resolve their cases through plea bargaining after the passage
of a three-strikes law.21
As before, these results are by no means conclusive evidence that defense lawyers
did not become more likely to accept plea bargains after the passage of the three-
strikes laws. In particular, defense lawyers may have become more willing to accept
plea bargains following the passage of the three-strike laws, but prosecutors may have
become less likely to o®er them. If this was the case, then no change in the fraction
of cases resolved through plea bargaining as observed above would result. However,
such a process would not account for increase in the fraction of three-strikes arrestees
21Note that it is also certainly plausible that defense attorney's do not change, or even become less
likely to accept plea bargains following the imposition of the sentencing laws, as they may prefer to take
their chances at a trial rather than accept the now longer sentence associated with taking a plea for a
three-strikes crime.
22being prosecuted for misdemeanors following the imposition of the three-strikes laws.
Therefore, it seems unlikely that the changes in prosecution charge outcomes observed
in Table 3 are primarily due to changes in defense attorney behavior.
5 Evaluating the E®ects Three-Strikes Laws
The evidence from the previous sections indicate that the fraction of individuals arrested
for three-strike crimes who are prosecuted for lesser misdemeanor crimes increases fol-
lowing the imposition of three-strikes laws, and that this e®ect is likely the result of
prosecutors attempting to circumvent the law for some defendants. This section esti-
mates the degree to which accounting for this change in prosecutor behavior alters the
estimated e®ect of these three-strikes laws on average sentencing.
Arguably, the primary measure of interest concerning the e®ect of a mandatory
minimum sentencing law on sentencing is the increase in the expected sentence following
the imposition of the law for all of the individuals arrested for the crimes targeted by the
law, or ¢E[sjarrested for 3-strike crime]. The comprehensive case data contained in the
State Court Processing Statistics allows us to directly calculate measure. Speci¯cally,
the pre-law mean sentence for all of those arrested for a three-strike crime is 27.1 months
(with standard error of 2.09), the post-law mean sentence for this group is 41.2 (with
a standard error of 6.0), giving an estimate for ¢E[sjarrested for 3-strike crime] of 14.1
months (standard error of 5.36).22 Changes in mean sentences for individuals arrested
for other non-three-strikes crimes in three-strikes states stayed roughly constant before
and after the passage of the three-strikes laws, going from 12.1 months (standard error
22In measuring sentence length, I took the minimum sentence when available, and used the maximum
sentence if the minimum was missing. The estimated size of ¢E[sjarrested for 3-strike crime] becomes
even smaller if those observations where minimum sentence was missing are dropped, becoming 29.0-20.0
= 9 months. Hence, the estimate in the text is an upper bound on the e®ect of these laws. Furthermore,
sentences (including life and death sentences) were topcoded to be 80 years in length. Changes in this
topcode do not substantially a®ect the results. For example, if sentences are topcoded at 60 years, the
estimate for ¢E[sjarrested for 3-strike crime] becomes 37.5 - 26.1 = 11.4 months. This means, as before,
the estimate in the text is an upper bound on the e®ect of these laws.
23of 0.37 months) before the passage of the law to 11.6 months (standard error of 0.62
months) following the passage of the law (a decrease that is not statistically signi¯cant
at the ten percent level). Hence, the above measure for ¢E[sjarrested for 3-strike crime]
is essentially una®ected if we subtract out contemporaneous changes in sentencing for
other non-three-strike felony arrestees.
Now, instead of having the relatively complete data for each case as contained in
the State Court Processing Statistics dataset, say that a researcher only had the more
commonly available data that could be obtained via court records. Namely, assume a
researcher only had data documenting each defendant's criminal history, prosecution
charge, whether or not the defendant was convicted, and any sentence imposed upon
conviction (i.e. assume the researcher did not have data on each defendant's initial
arrest charge). In this case, a \naive" way to estimate the e®ect of the three-strikes laws
on the expected sentence for being arrested for a three-strikes crime would be
¢E[sjarrested for 3-strike crime] =
E[pcjprosecuted for 3-strike crime;post-law] ¤ E[sjconvicted for 3-strike crime;post-law]
¡E[pcjprosecuted for 3-strike crime;pre-law] ¤ E[sjconvicted for 3-strike crime;pre-law];
(1)
where E[pcjprosecuted for 3-strike crime;post-law] is the expected probability of convic-
tion for those prosecuted for three-strikes crimes after the passage of the three-strikes
laws, E[sjconvicted for 3-strike crime;post-law] is the mean sentence for those convicted
for three-strikes crimes after the passage of the law, and E[pcjprosecuted for 3-strike crime;pre-law]
and E[sjconvicted for 3-strike crime;pre-law] are the analogous statistics before the pas-
sage of the three-strikes laws.
The above estimate is \naive" in the sense that it fails to take into account the type
of prosecutorial discretion discussed throughout this paper. Speci¯cally, equation (1)
would be correct only if prosecutors did not have the discretion to prosecute defendants
for lesser charges than their initial arrest charges. As shown previously, not only is it
clear that prosecutors do have this discretion, but they appear to become signi¯cantly
more likely to employ such discretion for three-strikes arrestees following the imposition
24of the three-strikes laws.
Given that those individuals who are prosecuted for lesser charges than their initial
arrest charge generally receive a shorter sentence upon conviction than those convicted
for their initial arrest charge, the naive estimate discussed above will likely lead to
substantially overstating the e®ect of three-strikes laws on average sentencing. Indeed
this appears to be the case. Estimating equation (1) using the State Court Processing
Statistics Data we get 0.726*65.0 - 0.722*40.2 = 18.2 months.23 Therefore, failing to
take into account the role of prosecutorial discretion with respect to the three-strikes
sentencing laws passed during the ¯rst half of the 1990s will lead to overstating the
e®ect of these laws on the expected sentence for being arrested for a three-strike crime
by over four months or almost thirty percent.24
6 Summary and Conclusion
This paper emphasizes the importance of accounting prosecutorial discretion when an-
alyzing the e®ects of mandatory minimum sentencing laws. In particular, prosecutors
generally have the discretion to prosecute a defendant for a lesser charge than the initial
arrest charge, and this use of such discretion can have dramatic e®ects on sentencing
with respect to mandatory minimum sentencing laws, as conviction for a crime targeted
23Standard errors for these estimates are 0.023 for the post-law conviction probability, 9.24 months for
the post-law mean sentence, 0.013 for the pre-law conviction probability, and 3.05 for the pre-law mean
sentence. Again, if sentences are topcoded at 60 years instead of 80 years, this estimate is essentially
unchanged, with the pre-law mean sentence being 38.7 (instead of 40.2) and the post-law mean sentence
being 59.0 (instead of 65.0).
24Once again, accounting for contemporaneous changes in the sentences given to defendants who were
prosecuted and convicted for non-three-strike felonies in three-strike states will not meaningfully a®ect
the results. Speci¯cally, the mean sentence for this group went from 19.8 months (with a standard error
of 0.61) before the three-strikes laws were passed, to 18.4 months (with a standard error of 0.99) after the
laws were passed. Furthermore, throwing out those observations for which the minimum prison sentence
was missing, further increases the di®erence in mean sentence for those convicted for three-strikes crimes
before and after the law, going from 37.8 months before the law, to 76.5 months after the law. Hence,
excluding these observations will cause the \naive" estimate to even further overstate the e®ect of the
three-strike laws on sentencing than the estimate discussed in the text.
25by the sentencing law can di®er substantially from a conviction for a lesser but related
crime not covered by the law.
In analyzing the use of this type of prosecutorial discretion with respect to several
three-strikes type sentencing laws implemented throughout the 1990s, I ¯nd that prose-
cutors become almost twice as likely to lower a felony arrest charge to a misdemeanor for
the purposes of prosecution, when conviction on the initial arrest charge would have lead
to sentencing under a three-strikes law. Moreover, the available evidence suggests that
prosecutors generally initiate such discretion due to their own preferences and resource
constraints, not as a reaction to changes in behavior by criminals, judges, juries, or
defense lawyers. However, such behavioral changes by these other actors in the judicial
system cannot be ruled out and a more explicit examination of these actors provides an
important avenue for further research.
Taking into account this use of prosecutorial discretion was also shown to have very
important implications with respect to estimating the average e®ect these three-strikes
laws have on sentencing. In particular, while I ¯nd that the three-strikes laws exam-
ined here appear to signi¯cantly increase the average sentence for being arrested for
a three-strike crime, failing to take into account prosecutorial discretion over prosecu-
tion charges will lead to overstating this increase by almost thirty percent. Therefore,
this paper reveals not only that prosecutors do alter their discretionary behavior in re-
sponse to three-strikes laws, but that this increased use of discretion has substantive
and meaningful implications with respect to analyzing the overall e®ects of these laws
on sentencing.
In generalizing these ¯ndings to other mandatory minimum sentencing laws, it is
worth noting that three-strikes laws target individuals arrested for serious crimes with
extensive criminal histories. This means that the group of defendants arrested for three-
strikes crimes consists of a very serious group of o®enders. Since prosecutors may be
less inclined to let these serious o®enders back out on the street, the use of prosecutor
discretion to circumvent three-strikes laws may be much more rare than the use of
prosecutor discretion to circumvent mandatory minimum sentences targeting less serious
crimes, such as drug or ¯rearm possession. Hence, the e®ects of prosecutorial discretion
26with respect to three-strikes sentencing laws may provide a lower bound on the degree
to which prosecutor discretion is used to mitigate the e®ects of a mandatory minimum
sentencing law.
The ¯ndings of this paper suggest that, besides some of the ethical concerns that have
been raised concerning certain mandatory minimum sentencing laws, these laws may also
be associated with pushing judicial discretion to less visible parts of the judicial system.
Moreover, where advocates of mandatory minimum sentencing laws argue that such
laws can decrease sentencing variation across criminals who commit similar crimes (and
have similar criminal histories) and eradicate overly lenient sentencing, such arguments
do not appear to be completely true, as prosecutorial discretion over the prosecution
charge can possibly lead to even more variation in sentencing, and certainly will lead
to even shorter sentences for some individuals than would have occurred without such
laws. Therefore, if society desires to systematically increase the sentences for criminals
who commit certain crimes, policies that allow for judges to retain some °exibility,
such as guideline ranges and allowing deviations from these guidelines if the reasons are
speci¯ed, may be more e®ective and transparent means of reaching this objective than
mandatory minimums.
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30Features of New Year of  Features of Preexisting
State Strikes Legislation Implementation Law Sentencing Laws.
CA Mandatory doubling of sentence 1994 CA Penal Code Life with no parole eligibility before
for any felony if one prior serious § 667 20 years for third violent felony 
or violent felony conviction; mand- conviction where separate prison 
atory life without parole for 25 years terms were served for the first two;
for any thrid felony conviction, if two life with no parole for fourth violent
prior serious or violent felony  felony conviction.
convictions.
FL Added new category of "violent 1995 FL Stat. Ann. Categories of habitual felony 
career criminal" to existing habitual § 775.084 offender and habitual violent 
offender statute; for third conviction offender ; range of enhanced sentences.
for specified violent offense, life if
first-degree felony, 30-40 years if 
second-degree felony, 10-15 years
if third-degree felony.
GA Mandatory life without parole for 1995 GA Code Ann. On fourth felony conviction offender
second specified violent felony  § 17-10-7 must serve maximum time imposed and
conviction. not be eligible for parole until maximum
sentence served.
IN Mandatory life without parole for 1994 IN Code Habitual offender law requiring 
second specified violent felony § 35-50-2-8.5 enhanced sentencing on third felony
conviction. conviction.
MD Life without parole for fourth violent 1994 MD Code Ann. Same law, except that carjacking and
felony conviction for which separate art. 27, § 643B armed carjacking were not on the list
prison terms were served for the first of offenses receiving this sentence.
three.
NJ Mandatory life without parole for 1995 NJ Stat. Ann. Rarely invoked "persistent offender"
third conviction for certain violent   § 2C:43-7.1 provision allowing sentence of one
felonies. degree higher than the conviction 
offense on third conviction for 1st, 2nd
or 3rd degree felonies.
PA Mandatory minimum enhanced  1995 PA Cons. Stat. Mandatory minimum enhanced sent-
sentence of 10 years for second   Ann. § 42-9714 ence of 5 years for second or 
conviction for crime of violence and subsequent conviction for certain 
25 years for third such conviction. specified crimes of violence.
TN Mandatory life without parole for  1994 TN Code Ann. Mandatory life without parole for third
second conviction for designated § 43-35-120 violent felony conviction.
violent felonies; same for third
conviction for other violent felonies
Table 1(a): Three Strikes Laws Passed Between 1990 and 1996
 Features of New Year of  Features of Preexisting
State Strikes Legislation Implementation Law Sentencing Laws.
UT  2nd and 3rd degree felony offenders 1995 UT Code Ann. 2nd and 3rd degree felonies receive
sentenced as 1st degree felons, and § 76-3-203.5 enhanced sentence of 5 years to life
1st degree felons not eligible for  if offender has two prior convictions 
probation, if they have at least as severe as second degree
two prior convictions for any   felonies.
felonies and a present conviction
for a violent felony.
VA Mandatory life without parole on 1994 VA Code Ann. No parole eligibility if convicted of 
third conviction for specified violent § 19.2-297.1 three separate violent felonies.
felonies or drug distribution charges.
WA Mandatory life without parole on  1993 WA Rev. Code Number of prior convictions factored
third conviction for specified   Ann. § 9.94A.392 into offender score on State's 
violent felonies. sentencing guidelines.
WI Mandatory life without parole 1994 WI Stat  For repeat felony offenders, up to 10
on third conviction for specified   Ann. § 939.62 years can be added to sentences of
serious offenses. 10 years or more; 6 years can be added
to sentences of 1-10 years.
*Information in Table taken from Exhibit 10 in Clark, Austin, and Henry (1997) and footnote 27 from
  Marvell and Moody (2001)
Table 1(a): (Continued)
 "Three-Strikes Crimes" Strikes Needed "Three-Strikes Crimes" as
State ("Strike Zone") to be "Out" Defined in Analysis
AL no 'three-strikes' law passed in 90's - -
AZ no 'three-strikes' law passed in 90's - -
CA Any Felony if one prior conviction was for Two Arrest (Conviction) for any felony if 
Murder, Rape, Lewd Act on Child, Cont- one or more previous violent felony 
inual Sex Abuse of Child, Penetration by convictions.
Foreign Object, Sexual Penetration by 
Force, Sodomy by Force, Oral Copulation
by Force, Robbery, Attempted Murder
Assualt with Deadly Weapon on Peace
Officer, Assault w/ Deadly Weaopon by
an Inmate, Assault w/ Intent to Rape or
Rob, Felony Resulting in Bodily Harm,
Arson Causing Bodily Injury, Carjacking,
Exploding Device w/ Intent to Injure or
Murder, Kidnapping, Mayhem, Arson,
Burglary of Occupied Dwelling, Grand 
Theft w/ Firearm, Drug Sales to Minors,
Any Felony w/ Deadly Weapon.
DC no 'three-strikes' law passed in 90's - -
FL Any forcible felony, aggravated stalk- Three Arrest (Conviction) for Murder, rape, robbery,
ing, aggravated child abuse, lewd or assault, or other violent crime, if 2 or more
indecent conduct, escape. prior violent felony convictions.
HI no 'three-strikes' law passed in 90's - -
GA Murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, Two Arrest (Conviction) for Murder, rape, robbery,
aggravated child molestation, aggravated or other violent (not including assault) , if
sodomy, aggravated sexual battery. one or more prior violent convictions.
Any Felony Four Any felony arrest (conviction) if 3 or more
previous felony convictions.
IN Murder, rape, sexual battery with weapon, Three Arrest (Conviction) for Murder, rape, robbery,
child molestation, arson, robbery, burglary other violent crime, (not including assault),
with weapon or resulting in serious injury, burglary with possession of weapons, or
drug dealing. drug trafficking, if two or more
more prior violent convictions, or 2 or more
prior drug convictions, or one or more violent 
and one or more prior drug convictions.
IL no 'three-strikes' law passed in 90's - -
KY no 'three-strikes' law passed in 90's - -
MD Murder, rape, robbery, 1st or 2nd degree Four, with Arrest (Conviction) for Murder, rape, robbery,
sexual offense, arson, burglary, kidnaping, prison terms  other violent crime (not including assault), 
carjacking, manslaughter, use of firearm in served for first burglary, or use of weapon in commission of
felony, assault with intent (to murder, three strikes. a felony, if 3 or more prior violent felony 
rape, rob, or commit sexual offense). convictions and 3 or more prior prison  terms.
Table 1(b): Descriptions of State Three-strikes Laws and the Laws as Captured by Data
 Eligible Crimes Strikes Needed "Eligible"  Group as
State ("Strike Zone") to be "Out" Defined in Analysis
MA no 'three-strikes' law passed in 90's - -
MI no 'three-strikes' law passed in 90's - -
MO no 'three-strikes' law passed in 90's - -
NJ Murder, robbery, carjacking Three Arrest (Conviction) for Murder, robbery,
if two or more prior violent convictions.
NY no 'three-strikes' law passed in 90's - -
OH no 'three-strikes' law passed in 90's - -
PA Murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, Two Arrest (Conviction) for Murder, rape, robbery,
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, assault, or other violent, if one or more prior
arson, kidnapping, robbery, aggravated violent convictions.
assault
TN Murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, Two, if prison Arrest (Conviction) for Murder, rape, robbery,
especially aggravated robbery, aggravated term served for if one or more prior violent convictions and
rape, rape of a child, aggravated arson. first strike. has spent time in prison before.
Same as above, plus rape, aggravated Three, if sep- Arrest (Conviction) for Murder, rape, robbery,
sexual battery, aggravated robbery,  arate terms ser- or other violent, if two or more prior violent
especially aggravated burglary, especially ved for first convictions and has had 2 or more stays in
aggravated child abuse, aggravated  two strikes. prison.
sexual exploitation of child.
TX no 'three-strikes' law passed in 90's - -
UT Any 1st or 2nd degree felony. Three Arrest (Conviction) for Murder, rape, robbery,
assault, other violent, burglary, drug 
trafficking,  if two or more prior felony
convictions.
VA Murder, kidnapping, robbery, carjacking, Three Arrest (Conviction) for Murder, rape, robbery,
sexual assault, conspiracy to commit any  or other violent (not including assault), if two
of above. or more prior violent convictions.
WA Murder 1, Murder 2, Rape 1 or Rape 2 Three Arrest (Conviction) for Murder, rape, robbery,
Controlled Subststance Homicide, Homicide assault, other violent crime, or burglary, if 2
by Abuse, Manslaughter 1 or 2, Child or more prior violent convictions.
Molestation or Exploitation, Robbery 1 or
2, Attempted Murder, Assault 1 or 2,
Explosion w/ threat to Humans, Extortion,
Kidnapping 1 or 2, Vehicular Assault,
Arson 1, Attempted Arson 1, Burglary,
Felony w/ Deadly Weapon, Possession
of Incendiary or Prohibited Explosive
Device, Treason, Promoting Prostitution, 
Leading Organized Crime.
WI Murder, manslaughter, vehicular homicide, Three Arrest (Conviction) for Murder, rape, robbery,
aggravated battery, abuse of child,  other violent, or burglary, if two or more 
robbery, sexual assault, taking hostages, prior violent convictions.
kidnapping, arson, burglary.
*Targeted crimes in each state taken from Exhibit 9 in Clark, Austin, and Henry (1997).
Table 1(b): (Continued)
 Table 2: Defendant Characteristics
Arrested for Arrested for
Characteristic  Three-Strike Crime "Other" Felony
arrested for violent crime 0.48 0.24
  (std. error) (0.012) (0.003)
  number of obs. 1,726 21,729
arrested for prop. crime 0.28 0.34
  (std. error) (0.010) (0.003)
  number of obs. 1,726 21,729
arrested for drug crime 0.21 0.34
  (std. error) (0.010) (0.003)
  number of obs. 1,726 21,729
arrested for oth. felony 0.09 0.08
  (std. error) (0.007) (0.002)
  number of obs. 1,726 21,729
age 31.4 29.1
  (std. error) (0.190) (0.065)
  number of obs. 1,726 21,672
percentage black 0.54 0.41
  (std. error) (0.014) (0.003)
  number of obs. 1,280 15,644
percentage Hispanic 0.30 0.28
  (std. error) (0.013) (0.004)
  number of obs. 1,280 15,644
percentage female 0.07 0.16
  (std. error) (0.006) (0.003)
  number of obs. 1,721 21,694
# of prior convictions 7.22 2.80
  (std. error) (0.150) (0.033)
  number of obs. 1,709 21,591
prior felony convictions 3.54 0.97
  (std. error) (0.730) (0.015)
  number of obs. 1,753 21,670
mean sentence (mths) 30.3 12.0
  (std. error) (2.11) (0.32)
  number of obs. 1,658 20,336
percentage convicted 0.73 0.73
  (std. error) (0.011) (0.003)
  number of obs. 1,726 21,729
percentage prosecuted for misdemeanor 0.06 0.13
  (std. error) (0.006) (0.002)
  number of obs. 1,726) 21,729
Sample includes all defendants with non-missing or pending adjudication outcomes, and valid data 
regarding the level of the adjudicated charge, any conviction offense, and criminal history (if from a three-
strike state). All statistics are weighted. Table 3: Proportions of Felony Defendants Prosecuted for Misdemeanors
Probability of being Prosecuted for a Misdemeanor
Group pre-law post-law difference
Arrested for 3-strike crime 0.055 0.093 0.038**
  (Std. Error) (0.007) (0.014) (0.015)
  Number of Obs.  1,289 437
Arrested for "other" felony 0.129 0.122 -0.007
  (Std. Error) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
  Number of Obs.  15,281 6,448
Difference-in-Difference 0.045**
(0.016)  
Sample includes all defendants in three-strike states with non-missing or pending adjudication outcomes, 
and valid data regarding the level of the adjudicated charge, any conviction offense, and criminal history (if 
from a three-strike state). Two asterisks mean coefficient is significant at the one percent level.  All 
statistics are weighted.Table 4: Probit Estimates of Probability of Being Prosecuted for a Misdemeanor
Control Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Arrested for 3-strike crime (post-law) 0.09** 0.09** 0.08** 0.08** 0.08**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.030) (0.022)
Arrested for 3-strike crime -0.09** -0.09** -0.06** -0.05** -0.05**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007)
Arrested after 3-strike law passed 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015)
From 3-strike state -0.09** -0.09** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027)
female - 0.01** 0.02** 0.01** 0.01**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
black - 0.01** -0.02** -0.02** -0.01
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Hispanic - 0.01* -0.03** -0.03** -0.02*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
age (in years) - 0.00* 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
on probation at time of arrest - - - -0.03** -0.03**
(0.005) (0.006)
on parole at time of arrest - - - -0.03** -0.03**
(0.007) (0.010)
in custody at time of arrest - - - -0.04** -0.05**
(0.014) (0.012)
fugitive at time of arrest - - - 0.01 0.02
(0.10) (0.18)
No. of previous felony convictions - - - 0.00* -0.01*
(0.000) (0.003)
No. of previous misdemeanor conv. - - - 0.00 0.00
(0.000) (0.000)
No. of previous violent convictions - - - 0.00 0.00
(0.003) (0.003)
No. of previous drug convictions - - - -0.01** -0.00
(0.003) (0.004)
pre-trial arrest - - - -0.01 0.00
(0.006) (0.008)
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
state dummies no no yes yes yes
arrest charge dummies no no no yes yes
s.e. adjusted for clustering by state in year no no no no yes
log likelihood -20,521.30 -20,478.10 -17,703.80 -17,579.30 -17,372.90
observed probability 0.17
(number of obs.) 45,997
Sample includes all defendants with non-missing or pending adjudication outcomes, and valid data 
regarding the level of the adjudicated charge, any conviction offense, and criminal history (if from a three-
strike state). One (two) asterisks mean coefficient is significant at the ten (one) percent level.  Dummies for 
missing observations for each variable also included in each specification.  All coefficients and standard 
errors have been normalized to represent the marginal change in probability (see paper for details). All 
statistics are weighted. Table 5: Proportions of Felony Defendants Being Prosecuted for Misdemeanors
(For California only and Not-including California)
Group pre-law post-law difference
California Only
Arrested for 3-strike crime 0.050 0.094 0.044**
  (Std. Error) (0.008) (0.017) (0.019)
  Number of Obs.  948 286
Arrested for "other" felony 0.095 0.106 0.011
  (Std. Error) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
  Number of Obs.  6,468 2,519
Difference-in-Difference (CA only) 0.033*
(0.020)
Not-including California
Arrested for 3-strike crime 0.069 0.092 0.023
  (Std. Error) (0.014) (0.024) (0.028)
  Number of Obs.  341 151
Arrested for "other" felony 0.154 0.132 -0.022**
  (Std. Error) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
  Number of Obs.  8,813 3,929
Difference-in-Difference (excluding CA) 0.045*
(0.027)
Probability of being Prosecuted for a Misdemeanor
Sample includes all defendants in three-strike states with non-missing or pending adjudication outcomes, 
and valid data regarding the level of the adjudicated charge, any conviction offense, and criminal history (if 
from a three-strike state). One (two) asterisks mean coefficient is significant at the ten (one) percent level. 
All statistics are weighted. Table 6: Changes in Defendant Characteristics in Three-Strike States
Characteristic pre-law post-law difference pre-law post-law difference diff-in-diff
arrested for violent crime 0.48 0.48 0.00 0.24 0.25 0.01** 0.01
  (std. error) (0.014) (0.024) 0.028 (0.003) (0.005) 0.070 (0.029)
  number of obs. 1,289 437 15,281 6,448
arrested for prop. crime 0.24 0.18 -0.06** 0.35 0.33 -0.02** -0.03
  (std. error) (0.012) (0.019) 0.022 (0.004) (0.006) 0.007 (0.023)
  number of obs. 1,289 437 15,281 6,448
arrested for drug crime 0.19 0.27 0.08** 0.33 0.36 0.03** 0.05*
  (std. error) (0.011) (0.022) 0.024 (0.004) (0.006) 0.007 (0.025)
  number of obs. 1,289 437 15,281 6,448
arrested for oth. felony 0.09 0.07 -0.02 0.08 0.07 -0.01** -0.00
  (std. error) (0.008) (0.012) 0.014 (0.002) (0.003) 0.004 0.015
  number of obs. 1,289 437 15,281 6,448
age 31.0 32.7 1.7** 28.8 30 1.1** 0.6
  (std. error) (0.215) (0.392) 0.447 (0.075) (0.122) 0.143 0.469
  number of obs. 1,289 437 15,240 6,432
black 0.52 0.59 0.7** 0.39 0.47 0.08** -0.01
  (std. error) (0.017) (0.026) 0.031 (0.005) (0.007) 0.009 0.032
  number of obs. 916 364 10,687 4,957
Hispanic 0.33 0.21 -0.12** 0.30 0.23 -0.06** -0.06
  (std. error) (0.016) (0.026) 0.031 (0.005) (0.006) 0.008 0.032
  number of obs. 916 364 10,687 4,957
female 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.16 0.17 0.01** -0.01
  (std. error) (0.007) (0.012) 0.014 (0.003) (0.005) 0.006 0.015
  number of obs. 1,284 437 15,253 6,441
prior convictions 7.05 7.82 0.77* 2.70 3.08 0.4** 0.39
  (std. error) (0.172) (0.299) 0.345 (0.039) (0.06) 0.072 0.352
  number of obs. 1,276 433 15,226 6,365
prior felony convictions 3.52 3.61 0.10 0.92 1.09 0.17** -0.08
  (std. error) (0.085) (0.14) 0.164 0.018 0.029 0.034 0.167
  number of obs. 1,287 436 15,259 6,411
Fraction of Group
Arrested for 3-strike Crime Arrested for "other" felony
Sample includes all defendants in three-strike states with non-missing or pending adjudication outcomes, 
and valid data regarding the level of the adjudicated charge, any conviction offense, and criminal history (if 
from a three-strike state). One (two) asterisk(s) mean coefficient is significant at the ten (one) percent level. 
All statistics are weighted.Table 7: Proportions of Felony Defendants Prosecuted for Misdemeanors
  (Drug Crime Arrestees Not Included)
Probability of being Prosecuted for a Misdemeanor
Group pre-law post-law difference
Arrested for 3-strike crime 0.056 0.111 0.055**
  (Std. Error) (0.008) (0.018) (0.019)
  Number of Obs.  1,030 323
Arrested for "other" felony 0.150 0.137 -0.013*
  (Std. Error) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)




Sample includes all defendants in three-strike states with non-missing or pending adjudication outcomes, 
and valid data regarding the level of the adjudicated charge, any conviction offense, and criminal history (if 
from a three-strike state). One (two) asterisk(s) mean coefficient is significant at the ten (one) percent level. 
All statistics are weighted.Table 8: Probit Estimates of Probability of Being Acquitted Given Prosecution for Felony (Trials only)
Control Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Arrested for 3-strike crime (post-law) -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.054)
Arrested for 3-strike crime -0.05** -0.04** -0.00 -0.00
(0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.022)
Arrested after 3-strike law passed -0.12** -0.05** -0.06** -0.06
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.051)
From 3-strike state -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.007) (0.073) (0.071) (0.047)
female - 0.06** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
black - -0.00 0.02* 0.02*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.013)
Hispanic - -0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
age (in years) - -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
in custody at adjudication - - -0.14** -0.14**
(0.007) (0.021)
on probation at time of arrest - - -0.00 -0.00
(0.008) (0.014)
on parole at time of arrest - - -0.02 -0.02
(0.013) (0.019)
in custody at time of arrest - - 0.03 0.03
(0.017) (0.021)
fugitive at time of arrest - - 0.06** 0.06**
(0.013) (0.016)
No. of previous felony convictions - - -0.00 -0.00
(0.002) (0.002)
No. of previous misdemeanor conv. - - -0.00 -0.00
(0.001) (0.001)
No. of previous violent convictions - - -0.00 -0.00
(0.003) (0.004)
No. of previous drug convictions - - -0.00 -0.00
(0.003) (0.003)
pre-trial arrest - - -0.01 -0.01
(0.011) (0.011)
year dummies yes yes yes yes
state dummies no yes yes yes
arrest crime dummies no no yes yes
s.e. adjusted for clustering by state in year no no no yes
log likelihood -6295.8 -5712.1 -5415.1 -5415.1
observed probability 0.85
(number of obs.) 15,218
Sample includes all defendants with non-missing or pending adjudication outcomes, and valid data 
regarding the level of the adjudicated charge, any conviction offense, and criminal history (if from a three-
strike state). One (two) asterisk(s) mean coefficient is significant at the ten (one) percent level.  Dummies 
for missing observations for each variable also included in each specification.  All coefficients and standard 
errors have been normalized to represent the marginal change in probability (see paper).  All statistics 
weighted.Table 9: Probit Estimates of Probability of Case Resolution through Plea Bargain
Control Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Arrested for 3-strike crime (post-law) -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.043)
Arrested for 3-strike crime -0.02 -0.01 -0.09** -0.04 -0.04
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.031)
Arrested after 3-strike law passed -0.07** -0.07** 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.040)
From 3-strike state 0.11** 0.10** -0.18** 0.20** -0.20**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037)
female - -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
black - 0.06** -0.05** -0.05** -0.05**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012)
Hispanic - 0.03** -0.01* -0.02* -0.02
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.020)
age (in years) - 0.00 -0.00* -0.00** -0.00*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
in custody at adjudication - - 0.14** 0.13** 0.13**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.014)
on probation at time of arrest - - - 0.05** 0.05**
(0.007) (0.014)
on parole at time of arrest - - - 0.03** 0.03
(0.011) (0.031)
in custody at time of arrest - - - -0.05* -0.05
(0.025) (0.035)
fugitive at time of arrest - - - 0.03* 0.03
(0.015) (0.026)
No. of previous felony convictions - - - 0.00** 0.00*
(0.002) (0.002)
No. of previous misdemeanor conv. - - - 0.00** 0.00**
(0.001) (0.001)
No. of previous violent convictions - - - -0.02** -0.02**
(0.003) (0.006)
No. of previous drug convictions - - - -0.01* -0.01*
(0.003) (0.003)
pre-trial arrest - - - 0.07** 0.07**
(0.009) (0.013)
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
state dummes no no yes yes yes
arrest crime dummies no no no yes yes
s.e. adjusted for clustering by state in year no no no no yes
Log Likelihood -29,871.70 -29,662.90 -27,681.20 -27,121.00 -27,121.00
observed probaility 0.63
(number of obs.) 45,997
Sample includes all defendants with non-missing or pending adjudication outcomes, and valid data 
regarding the level of the adjudicated charge, any conviction offense, and criminal history (if from a three-
strike state). One (two) asterisk(s) mean coefficient is significant at the ten (one) percent level.  Dummies 
for missing observations for each variable also included in each specification. All coefficients and standard 
errors have been normalized to represent the marginal change in probability (see paper). Statistics weighted. 